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According to Aristotle, man is zóon logòn échon, the animal for whom lan-
guage is the main etiological and constitutive element. From the Greek phi-
losopher to our age, the primacy of language has affected all field of human 
knowledge, from philosophy to cognitive science, marking the border 
between what is rational – and therefore worthy of being studied – and what 
belongs to instinct, irrationality, primitivity. Donovan O. Schaefer wants 
to show the fallacy of this perspective, and opens his ambitious Religious 
Affects with a famous ethological anecdote: the famous “waterfall dance” 
recognized by primatologist Jane Goodall as the proof of religious beliefs 
also among non-human animals, typically considered devoid of language.
The chimpanzees of Gombe (Tanzania) observed by the scholar since 
the sixties have shown a series of behaviors (rituals, responses to death, 
social interactions) very similar to those that in human terms are considered 
forms “religion”. “For ten minutes or more they may perform this magnifi-
cent ‘dance’. Why? Is it not possible that the chimpanzees are responding 
to some feeling like awe? A feeling generated by the mystery of the water” 
(Goodall 1999, 189). Religious Affects starts from here to show that bodili-
ness, and not language, is the common ground on which one should rethink 
religion: one should focus on the body as a prelinguistic element, which 
Michel Foucault already proved to be the vehicle of any power dynamic. 
Initially taken as a private phenomenon, a kind of exclusively human “inti-
mate psychologism” – think of the definition of “sacred” given by Mircea 
Eliade, that of “structure of consciousness” – with the Darwinian revolu-
tion, the phenomenological and post-structuralist reflection, affect theory, 
postcolonial studies, queer and feminist thinking, religion has become a 
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form of power like any other, made possible and unfolding through the 
relationship between the body and the world. But let’s have a closer look at 
the theoretical proposal made in Religious Affect. 
The book aims to deconstruct religion, both as a cognitive expression 
of a self and as a merely intra-human (epi)phenomenon, through affect 
theory, which “sees body moving through worlds under the pressure of a 
complex welter of affects, with language weaving between and reshaping 
those pressures only sometimes – and even then only hintingly and une-
venly” (9). The body conceived as materiality and as embodied expression 
of the phylogenetic history that generated it “before language, before cos-
mology, even before ‘thought’ understood as away of converting a situation 
into an explanation, […] interacts with the world, and produces a field of 
sensations through that interaction” (9). Affect theory It allows the author 
to bypass the linguistic fallacy, showing that language is also a form of 
power (Foucault docet), and to note the flows that affect the bodies of ani-
mals “that register and transmit power through a wide spectrum of shifting 
channels, a subtle, a sub-rosa matrix of interactions that happens between 
bodies and worlds” (207). This is what Derrida defined a “heterogeneous 
multiplicity of animal bodies”: a jumble of flesh and organs, personalities 
and emotions, minds, actions and relationships, each with their preroga-
tives and priorities.
As for the structure of the book, it is divided into three main parts: 
intransigence, compulsion, and accident. Each section presents a theoretical 
proposal followed by a case study; the final chapter explores the implica-
tions of affect theory in the study of religion, bringing the latter in the same 
field as critical studies – especially those dealing with non-human animals. 
Let’s go through the different parts of the book. In “intransigence”, 
Schaefer shows that the humanities do not have an adequate vocabulary 
to think of the animality of the body, “whether our own or those of their 
of other animals” (57); instead, they emphasise the dividing line that sees 
the bodies of non-human animals as deficient in history. The chapter then 
connects affect theory and evolutionary biology, which since Darwin has 
related man to other animals. In the famous Expression of the Emotion in 
Man and Animals (1890), British naturalist had supported the biological 
basis of a common emotional basis between humans and non-human ani-
mals: a common ground that, as demonstrated by the psychologist Silvan 
Tomkins, allows individuals to “develop multiple channels of sensitivity 
defining a pluriform set of relationship with their world” (46). Therefore, 
affect theory – in the light of the developments of biology and evolutionary 
theory – allows one to rethink the traditional phenomenological approach 
to the study of religion – from Otto to James, to Durkheim – highlight-
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ing its historical and biological dynamics; ultimately, «basic emotions have 
histories, bus these histories move at a time scale that vastly exceeds human 
experience, let alone human history. The varieties of animal affect fall into 
this category of semistable form emerging out of shapeshifting embodied 
histories” (47).
In “compulsion” the author starts from a very simple question, namely, 
why is confinement in total solitude considered torture? A completely iso-
lated body for a long period of time is not only a mere object positioned 
in a place but a subject under forces that originate from its own biological 
history and from the outside world. The example of isolation, in this sense, 
recalls what Derrida calls “auto-affection”, that is, a living being’s illusion 
of ownership of their own emotions, to the point that a prisoner in this 
condition cannot last long before going crazy. We are social beings, our 
bodies are primarily social bodies and isolation, apart from death, is the 
most cruel torture that we can undergo.
Derrida (2008) has also noted that what he calls “carno-fallogocentric” 
discourse is what denies any animal dimension to the body; this rhetoric 
outlines Man as and angelic creature that only sporadically leaves his 
heavenly abide to deal with earthly matters. Schaefer shows that, rather 
than being aware of their actions, bodies are subject to fields of forces 
which move them in different directions: “bodies are desire in motion. 
Animals are moved by subtly rich and urgently necessary landscape of 
emotions” (100). Not coincidentally, the well-known ethologist Frans de 
Wall described human beings as “obligatorily gregarious”, to the point of 
making up “origin stories that neglect this deep connection by presenting 
human as loners who grudgingly come together are ignorant of primate 
evolution” (De Waal 2006, 219). At this point – the author suggests – it 
would make more sense to wonder “where do bodies go?” rather than 
“what do bodies believe?” (106). 
In the chapter entitled “accident”, in the light of the affective turn, 
the author emphasizes the need to redefine the way we think about the 
“rationality” within animal behavior, including religion. The first target 
of Schaefer’s criticism is the Marxists-social approach that sees religion as 
the “opium of the people” according to Marx’s definition: that is, the tool 
used by the ruling class to hide their economic and political interests from 
the lower classes. The second target is the evolutionary approach, which 
considers religion the expression of an adaptive function within a cost-
benefit dialectic. According to the author, both perspectives are inherently 
reductionist in that they reduce the complexity of embodied life to a single 
level when in fact “animal bodies – and animal religions – are simply much 
queerer than that” (177).
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In conclusion, Religious Affect does not aim to “produce a static cata-
log of forms of animal religion” (206) but to change the borders of what 
is usually considered “religion”. This wider outlook allows to also include 
the “religious bodies” of animals, so as to better understand not only other 
animals but also our own religious dimension, starting from the bodily 
dimension. This is the goal of the book: to see religion as an interspecific 
common trait of living beings, where human and non-human animals are 
not (just) subjects but also fields of forces that allow one to understand 
how religion operates through the bodies – “Where do bodies go?” – and, 
ultimately, how power works. “Animal religion overturns the sentence of 
solitary confinement imposed on human bodies by our own anthropocen-
tric presuppositions, returning us to other bodies n and in the earth” (211). 
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